

January 2008

## **CBM Reader on Publicly Available CBMs 2006 and 2007**

The exchange of information under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in the form of politically-binding Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), will enter very soon its 21<sup>st</sup> year. Starting in 1987, the rate of participation has clambered upwards reaching, this year, the highest submission level achieved so far, 64 declarations as of mid January. This number is still a far cry from universal participation for a Convention which boasts 159 Member States.

This CBM reader summarizes the data submitted in 2006 and 2007 by countries which made their CBM submission public or provided a copy directly to our Research Group. We intend this reader to serve two purposes, firstly to present the relevant publicly available CBM data in a summarised fashion, and secondly to applaud those states which made a particular effort to foster transparency in the area of biological arms control by highlighting their willingness to make the CBM submissions available to the public.

This CBM reader has been prepared in the framework of our ongoing efforts to strengthen the CBM regime in order to increase transparency around bioweapon relevant activities. Such transparency is indispensable for building confidence in compliance with the BWC and must extend to all stakeholders including civil society.

### **Development of the CBM regime in 2006 and 2007**

At the Sixth Review Conference, States decided to establish the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). One of the tasks the ISU was assigned is to undertake all matters related to the CBMs, including collection, some very basic analyses, distribution via a secure website, and serving as a contact point for assistance related to the preparation of the CBMs. However, no decision was taken at the Sixth Review Conference to review the content of the CBMs, neither directly at the Conference nor during the intersessional process 2007-2010. Furthermore, States Parties decided to limit the availability of the CBMs by stipulating that information supplied by a States Party must not be circulated or made available beyond States Parties and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs without the express permission of that States Party.

### **CBM-specific publications in 2006 and 2007**

- Isla, N. (2007), Strengthening the Confidence Building Measure Regime: A Catalogue of Recommendations, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Occasional Paper No. 3.
- Lentzos, F. and Woodward, A. (2007), National Data Collection Processes for CBM Submissions, Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports.
- Zmorzynska, A. (2007), Neither Here Nor There - Disease Outbreak Data in the Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and in Open Sources, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Occasional Paper No. 4.
- Working Paper “Enhancement of the Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) Process”, submitted by France on behalf of the European Union at the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC (2006), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4.
- Working Paper “Confidence Building Measures”, submitted by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay at the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC (2006), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.12.

- Working Paper “Actions to Improve the Confidence Building Measures”, submitted by Switzerland at the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC (2006), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14.
- Working Paper “Confidence Building Measures”, submitted by South Africa at the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC (2006), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.21.
- Working Paper “Proposal for the Modification of the Format of Confidence-Building Measures Forms”, submitted by Switzerland at the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC (2006), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.37.
- Working Paper “National Data Collection Processes for CBM Submissions”, submitted by Switzerland at the Meeting of Experts of the BWC (2007), BWC/MSP/2007/MX/WP.10.
- Working Paper “Submission of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)”, submitted by France at the Meeting of the States Parties of the BWC (2007), BWC/MSP/2007/WP.4.

## Participation in the CBM regime

### 2006

First-time submission: Malaysia


1. Argentina	12. Croatia	23. Hungary	34. Malta	45. Slovakia
2. Armenia	13. Cuba	24. Iran	35. Morocco	46. Slovenia
3. Australia	14. Cyprus	25. Ireland	36. Netherlands	47. South Korea
4. Austria	15. Czech Republic	26. Italy	37. New Zealand	48. Spain
5. Belarus	16. Denmark	27. Japan	38. Norway	49. Sweden
6. Belgium	17. Estonia	28. Latvia	39. Poland	50. Switzerland
7. Brazil	18. Finland	29. Libya	40. Portugal	51. Tunisia
8. Bulgaria	19. France	30. Liechtenstein	41. Romania	52. Ukraine
9. Canada	20. Georgia	31. Lithuania	42. Russia	53. UK
10. Chile	21. Germany	32. Luxembourg	43. San Marino	54. USA
11. China	22. Greece	33. Malaysia	44. Serbia	55. Uzbekistan

### 2007

First-time submissions: Brunei, Lebanon, Nigeria

1. Argentina	14. Croatia	27. India	40. Mexico	53. Slovakia
2. Armenia	15. Cuba	28. Iran	41. Morocco	54. Slovenia
3. Australia	16. Cyprus	29. Ireland	42. Netherlands	55. South Korea
4. Austria	17. Czech Republic	30. Italy	43. New Zealand	56. Spain
5. Bangladesh	18. Denmark	31. Japan	44. Nigeria	57. Sweden
6. Belarus	19. Ecuador	32. Jordan	45. Norway	58. Switzerland
7. Belgium	20. Estonia	33. Kyrgyzstan	46. Poland	59. Tunisia
8. Brazil	21. Finland	34. Latvia	47. Portugal	60. Turkey
9. Brunei	22. France	35. Lebanon	48. Romania	61. Ukraine
10. Bulgaria	23. Georgia	36. Libya	49. Russia	62. UK
11. Canada	24. Germany	37. Lithuania	50. San Marino	63. USA
12. Chile	25. Greece	38. Luxembourg	51. Senegal	64. Uzbekistan
13. China	26. Hungary	39. Malta	52. Serbia	

Figure 1. Number of CBM submissions per year between 1987 and 2007




## Publicly available CBMs from 2006 and 2007

### Countries that made their 2006 CBM submission available to the public:

- On ODA website (www.unog.ch/bwc): Australia, Finland, Lithuania, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
- On OPBW website (www.opbw.org): Australia, Finland, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
- Other sources: Australia (www.dfat.gov.au), United Kingdom (www.fco.gov.uk)
- CBMs provided directly to our Research Group: Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, New Zealand

### Countries that made their 2007 CBM submission available to the public:

- On ODA website (www.unog.ch/bwc): Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Sweden, Switzerland
- On OPBW website (www.opbw.org): Australia, Switzerland, United Kingdom
- Other sources: Australia (www.dfat.gov.au), Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de), United Kingdom (www.fco.gov.uk)
- CBMs provided directly to our Research Group: Germany, Slovakia



## Summary of declared information

- Form A, part 1:** Number of maximum biological containment facilities (BL4 or equivalent) declared.
- Form A, part 2 (i):** Does the States Party declare having a biodefence programme?
- Form A, part 2 (iii):** Number of biodefence facilities declared.
- Form B (ii):** Number of unusual disease outbreaks declared.
- Form F:** Does the States Party declare having a past offensive and/or defensive programme?
- Form G:** Number of vaccine production facilities declared.
- ND:** “Nothing to declare” indicated in Form 0.
- NN:** “Nothing new to declare” indicated in Form 0. In brackets is the most current answer and the year it was provided.
- No data:** No information was declared despite not indicating “Nothing to declare” or “Nothing new to declare” in Form 0.

### 2006

Country	Form A, part 1	Form A, part 2 (i)	Form A, part 2 (iii)	Form B (ii)	Form F (off/def)	Form G
Australia	3	yes	1	0	no/no	1
Croatia	NN (0-1995)	NN (no-1995)	NN (0-1995)	no data	no/no	1
Czech Republic	1	NN (no-1998)	NN (0-1998)	ND	NN (no/yes-1998)	5
Finland	4	yes	1	ND	ND	0
Germany	3 <sup>1</sup>	yes	4	ND	NN (no/yes-1992)	3
Latvia	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND
Lithuania	0	no	ND	ND	no/no	0
Malaysia	0	no	ND	ND	no/no	0
New Zealand	0	no	0	no data	no/no	0
Sweden	1	yes	no data	0	no/no	2
Switzerland	NN (1-2002)	yes	1	ND	NN (no/yes-2001)	NN (2-2002)
UK	7 <sup>2</sup>	yes	1	2	NN (yes/yes-1992)	3

<sup>1</sup> Includes one maximum containment facility not suitable for work with human pathogens.

<sup>2</sup> Includes two animal pathogen maximum containment facilities with the following standards: SAPO (Specified Animal Pathogens Order) and ACDP (Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens).

Country	Form A, part 1	Form A, part 2 (i)	Form A, part 2 (iii)	Form B (ii)	Form F (off/def)	Form G
Australia	3	yes	1	0	no/no	1
Denmark	0	yes	1	2	no/yes	2
Finland	0	yes	1	ND	ND	0
Germany	3 <sup>3</sup>	yes	4	ND	NN (no/yes-1992)	3
Lithuania	0	no	ND	ND	no/no	0
Slovakia	NN (0-2005)	ND	ND	ND	NN (ND-2003)	NN (2-2004)
Sweden	1	yes	no data	0	no/no	2
Switzerland	NN (1-2002)	yes	1	ND	NN (no/yes-2001)	NN (2-2002)
UK	7 <sup>4</sup>	yes	1	2	NN (yes/yes-1992)	3

**Figure 3. Trends in the number of vaccine production facilities declared between 2001 and 2006**




Figure 3 shows only the data from the 14 States Parties whose 2006 or 2007 CBM submissions are publicly available. For years in which a States Party's information on vaccine production facilities is unavailable because, for example, the States Party did not submit a CBM, the values are extrapolated from declarations from the following year. Category A agents counted include anthrax, botulism, plague, tularemia, viral hemorrhagic fevers and smallpox, as designated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA.

**Figure 4. Number of first-time CBM submissions per year**




Figure 4 shows the number of first-time submissions in each year of the CBM mechanism. 97 countries have submitted a CBM one or more times. 62 member states have yet to submit their first CBM.

### Research Group for Biological Arms Control

The aim of the Research Group for Biological Arms Control is to contribute, through innovative research and outreach activities, to the universal prevention of biological weapon development, production and use. The development of new strategies, concepts and methods for verification and ensuring compliance is the core research area of the Group.

### Contact

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2.

The following three tables summarize the data declared in CBM Form A, part 1, Form A, part 2 (ii) and (iii) and Form G of the publicly available CBM submissions from 2006 and 2007. The first table provides the names and locations of facilities declared in CBM Form A, part 1, their containment levels, the year(s) they were declared, and whether the facilities were wholly or partly funded by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The second table indicates the overall funding for the biodefence programme as declared in CBM Form A, part 2 (ii) in 2006 and 2007, and lists the names and locations of biodefence facilities declared in CBM Form A, part 2 (iii), specifying the year(s) they were declared. The third table provides the names and locations of vaccine production facilities declared in CBM Form G, the year(s) they were declared, and the diseases against which vaccines were produced. For all three tables blank cells indicate that there was no CBM submission, that no data was provided or that it was not made publicly available in the respective year.

Country	Name and location of facility declared in CBM Form A, part 1	Cont. level	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007	MOD funded
Australia	1. Australian Animal Health Laboratory (Geelong)	BL4	x	x	no
	2. National High Security Quarantine Laboratory (North Melbourne)	BL4	x	x	no
	3. Queensland Health Scientific Services (Cooper Plains)	BL4	x	x	no
Croatia	<i>"Nothing to declare"</i>		x		
Czech Republic	1. Collection of Animal Pathogenic Microorganisms (Brno)	BL3	x		no
	2. Institute of Molecular Pathology (Hradec Králové)	BL2	x		wholly
	3. Central Military Health Institute, Department Těchonín (Těchonín)	BL2	x		wholly
	4. Laboratory for Biological Monitoring and Protection (Milín)	BL4	x		no
	5. Laboratory of Molecular Biology (Hradec Králové)	BL2	x		wholly
	6. Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Infectious Diseases and Epizootology, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine (Brno)	BL3	x		no
Denmark	1. The Danish National Centre for Biological Defences, State Serum Institute <sup>5</sup>	no data		x	no
Finland	1. Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (Helsinki)	BL3	x	x	partly
	2. National Public Health Institute, Bacteriological and Virological Laboratories and Biothreat Unit (Helsinki)	BL3	x	x	partly
	3. Yersinia Research Laboratory (Helsinki and Turku)	BL2	x	x	no
	4. Department of Virology, University of Helsinki (Helsinki)	BL3	x	x	partly
	5. Finnish Food Safety Authority (Helsinki)	BL3		x	no
	6. Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (Lakiala)	BL2		x	wholly
	7. National Public Health Institute, Department of Viral Diseases and Immunology, National Public Health Institute (Helsinki)	BL3		x	no
Germany	1. Bernhard-Nocht-Institut für Tropenmedizin (Hamburg)	BL4	x	x	partly
	2. Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Federal Research Institute for Animal Health (Insel Riems)	BL4 <sup>6</sup>	x	x	no
	3. Institut für Virologie der Philipps Universität Marburg (Marburg)	BL4	x	x	no
Latvia	<i>"Nothing to declare"</i>		x		
Lithuania	1. Microbiological Laboratory of Vilnius Public Health Centre (Vilnius)	BL3	x	x	no
	2. Lithuanian AIDS Center Laboratory (Vilnius)	BL2	x	x	no
	3. National Veterinary Laboratory (Vilnius)	BL2	x	x	no
Malaysia	1. Science & Technology Research Institute for Defence (Kajang)	"normal"	x		wholly
New Zealand	1. Investigation and Diagnostic Centre (Upper Hutt)	BL3+	x		no
Slovakia	<i>"Nothing new to declare"</i>			x	
Sweden	1. Swedish Defence Research Agency Division of NBC Defence (Umeå)	BL3	x	x	partly
	2. Säkerhetslaboratorium, Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control (Solna)	BL4	x	x	no
	3. National Veterinary Institute (Uppsala)	BL3	x	x	no
Switzerland	<i>"Nothing new to declare"</i>		x	x	
United Kingdom	1. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Porton Down, Salisbury)	BL4	x	x	wholly
	2. Health Protection Agency (Colindale, London)	BL4	x	x	no
	3. Health Protection Agency, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (Porton Down, Salisbury)	BL4	x	x	no
	4. National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (Potters Bar)	BL4	x	x	no
	5. NIMR Containment 4 Building C (London)	BL4	x	x	no
	6. Veterinary Laboratories Agency (Addlestone)	SAPO4	x	x	no
	7. Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory (Woking)	SAPO4	x	x	no

<sup>5</sup> No location provided.

<sup>6</sup> Maximum containment facility not suitable for work with human pathogens.

Country	Total funding in EUR <sup>7</sup>		Name and location of biodefence facility declared in CBM Form A, Part 2 (iii)	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007
	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007			
Australia	1.2 M	1.5 M	Human Protection and Performance Division, DSTO (Fishermans Bend)	x	x
Croatia	NN		"Nothing new to declare"	NN	
Czech Republic	NN		"Nothing new to declare"	NN	
Denmark		1.9 M	Danish National Center for Biological Defence, State Serum Institute <sup>8</sup>		x
Finland			Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (Helsinki)	x	x
Germany	12.9 M	11.7 M	NBC-Defence and Self-Protection School of the Bundeswehr (Sonthofen)	x	x
			Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology (Munich)	x	x
			Federal Armed Forces Scientific Institute for Protection Technologies – NBC Protection (Munster)	x	x
Latvia	ND		"Nothing to declare"	ND	
Lithuania	ND	ND	"Nothing to declare"	ND	ND
Malaysia	ND		"Nothing to declare"	ND	
New Zealand	ND		"Nothing to declare"	ND	
Slovakia		ND	"Nothing to declare"		ND
Sweden	2.8 M	2.8 M	No data provided in CBM	no data	no data
Switzerland	0.6 M	0.6 M	Spiez Laboratory, Swiss NBC Defence Establishment (Spiez)	x	x
United Kingdom	62.8 M	63.9 M	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, (Porton Down Salisbury)	x	x

Country	Name and location of vaccine production facility declared in CBM Form G	Category A diseases <sup>9</sup>	Other diseases	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007
Australia	1. CSL Limited (Parkville)	Plague	yes	x	x
Croatia	1. Institute of Immunology (Zagreb)	-	yes	x	
Czech Republic	1. Baxter BioScience s.r.o (Kostolec nad Černými lesy)	-	yes	x	
	2. Sevapharma a.s. (Prague)	-	yes	x	
	3. Bioveta a.s. (Ivanovice nad Hané)	Anthrax	yes	x	
	4. Dyntec s.r.o. (Terezín)	-	yes	x	
	5. BIOPHARMA, Research institute of Biopharmacy and Veterinary Drugs (Jiluvé u Prahy)	-	yes	x	
Denmark	1. Statens Serum Institute (Copenhagen)	-	yes		x
	2. Bavarian Nordic A/S (Kvistgård)	Smallpox	yes		x
Finland	"Nothing new to declare"			x	x
Germany	1. Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics GmbH & Co. KG (Marburg)	Botulism	yes	x	x
	2. Sächsisches Serumwerk Dresden Niederlassung der SmithKline Beecham Pharma GmbH & Co KG (Dresden)	-	yes	x	x
	3. Impfstoffwerk Dessau-Tornau GmbH (Rosslau)	Smallpox	yes	x	x
Latvia	"Nothing to declare"			x	
Lithuania	"No vaccines are produced in Lithuania."	-	-	x	x
Malaysia	"Nothing to declare"			x	
New Zealand	"No vaccine production sites."	-	-	x	
Slovakia	"Nothing new to declare"				x
Sweden	1. SBL Vaccin AB (Solna)	-	yes	x	x
	2. UniTech Biopharma (Matfors)	-	yes	x	x
Switzerland	"Nothing new to declare"			x	x
United Kingdom	1. Health Protection Agency, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Porton Down (Salisbury)	Anthrax	no	x	x
	2. MedImmune (Liverpool)	-	yes	x	x
	3. Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics Limited (Liverpool)	-	yes	x	x

<sup>7</sup> National currencies were converted to Euros using the online service, www.x-rate.com. April 15th, the deadline for submitting the CBM to the UN, of each respective year was selected as the date for the currency conversion.

<sup>8</sup> No location provided.

<sup>9</sup> As designated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA.