The Role of Non-State Actors in Promoting Nonproliferation and Arms Control Efforts Against Biological Weapons

Nicolas Isla Brussels, 10 October, 2008



Project overview

- Base institution: Hamburg Research Group for Biological Arms Control – University of Hamburg.
- Host institution: Harvard Sussex Program – University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unit.
- Project duration: two years



Introduction to Biological Arms Control

- Breakdown in 2001 of negotiations on the Verification Protocol.
- Although some headway made at the Sixth Review Conference in November 2006, the BTWC does not have a mechanism to verify compliance.
- The EU can play an important role in developing more effective nonproliferation efforts



Project description

- Part 1: Comprehensive analysis of non state actor involvement in BW policy development.
- Part 2: Case studies the role of NSAs in other areas of arms control
 - NGOs in MBT
 - Private industry in CWC
 - IAEA in NPT
- Part 3: The EU's role





- Non state actors: NGOs, MNCs and IGOs.
- Why have non state actors not been involved in security discourses?
 - Security is an issue dominated by state actors.
 - Non state actors are not made up of elected leaders.
 - BW programmes are often very secret.



Examples of non state actors involvement in BW control

- Civil Society activities
 - Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
 - Personal relations
 - Yellow rain investigation
 - NGOs
- Industry
- Office for Disarmament Affairs and the ISU



NSA involvement

Civil Society Activities

- Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: BW Workshops are convened in parallel with BWC meeting inviting experts from civil society, government and industry.
 - Frank and open discussion
 - Diversity
 - Exclusive
- Personal relations: Harvard Scientist Dr. Matthew Meselson requested by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to prepare report on BW. President Nixon based his decision partially on this report.
 - Occurs regularly in many fields but is a powerful mechanism for NS influence
 - Can be technical experts
- Yellow rain investigations: US accused Soviet Union of using fungal toxin in Vietnam and Laos between 1975-1983. Civil society group undertook independent investigation to disprove allegations.
 - Monitoring/verification can be done by civil society
 - Can be unbiased
 - Can be more creative when in such an open forum





- Non-governmental organisation: the BW epistemic community was spurred into action after the failure of the VP. There are 10-15 organisation which are dedicated to BW, the rest have casual interest. Some organisation function by providing policy advice others are more whistleblowers.
 - A community of NGOs functions best when there both activist and academic roles are played
 - Public pressure is the most important tool NGOs have
 - Civil society monitoring is possible but must come out of its own initiative





- Industry: Industry was against the Verification Protocol (1995-2001) from the beginning. After Pfizer fiasco (1994), industry imposed demands on US positions and was reluctant to cooperate. Industry is widely credited with some responsibility for failure of VP.
 - Industry is a powerful force to reckon with
 - Its is not devoid of a sense of "good" but interests must also be protected
 - Lobby groups may not necessarily be the most appropriate actors to talk to
- Office for Disarmament Affairs and the ISU: ODA is developing a Bio-Incidence database and maintains a roster of BW experts for the Secretary General mechanism. The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) functions as of 2006 as the focal point for the BWC States Parties.
 - The ODA and ISU do what they can to act independently within a state centric framework. They are constrained both through their mandate and financially



EU and arms control

Multilateralism is the cornerstone of EU non-proliferation strategy and is highlighted in:

- EU Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World.
- EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass destruction.





- EU approach to bioweapons control, manifested as support for the BTWC, is shown in:
 - February 2006 Joint Action
 - March 2006 Action Plan
 - March 2006 Common Position
- EU also supports greater collaboration with relevant partners:
 - State partners but also UN and NATO.
 - Collaboration with EU private industry and civil society is only starting to catch on:
 - BioWeapons Prevention Project
- January 2007 Updated List of Priorities



Left to do

- Case studies
 - Mine Ban Treaty
 - Role of NGOs
 - Non Proliferation Treaty
 - Role of IAEA
- The EU's role
- Assemble and conclude



Thanks! Questions?

www.biological-arms-control.org

