

## CBM Reader on Publicly Available CBMs 2008

The exchange of information under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in the form of politically-binding Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), will enter very soon its 23rd year. The Reader provides information on CBM-related developments in 2008 and presents in a summarized fashion the data submitted in 2008 by the 14 countries which made their CBM submission public. The Reader aims to underline the importance of participating in the CBM data exchange as the only established permanent transparency tool for the BWC and to highlight the particular efforts of an increasing number of states to foster transparency by making their CBM submissions available to the public.

With the Seventh BWC Review Conference three years down the road and a recognised need to discuss the CBMs at that conference, now is the right time to start raising awareness and begin preparatory discussions on possible improvements to the CBM mechanism in terms of both content and organisation.

The 2008 CBM Reader has been prepared in the framework of our ongoing efforts to strengthen the BWC's CBM regime in order to increase transparency around bioweapon relevant activities globally. Such transparency is indispensable for building confidence in compliance with the BWC and must extend to all stakeholders including civil society. For more information on this project please visit [http://www.biological-arms-control.org/Projects/CBM\\_en.htm](http://www.biological-arms-control.org/Projects/CBM_en.htm).

### Development of the CBM regime in 2008

The CBM regime has received little attention since the Sixth BWC Review Conference in November/December 2006. Furthermore, they are not on the list of issues to be discussed during the intersessional process meetings between 2007 and 2010. On the administrative side, according to a United Nations official, the secure CBM website maintained by the Implementation Support Unit is up and running, and the vast majority of states are using it to submit their CBMs and receive CBMs from other countries. Paper distribution seems to have virtually ceased and concerns over data security have obviously been resolved.

#### Facts about the BWC and its CBMs

**BWC Member States:** 162

**New BWC Member States in 2008:** 4

**National contact points:** 65

**CBMs submitted in 2008:**  
60 as of 24 November 2008

**First-time CBM submissions in 2008:** 4

**Number of states having participated in  
the CBM data exchange in 22 years:** 101

**Next Review Conference:** 2011

## CBM-specific publications in 2008

Preparing the Ground for the CBM Content Debate: What Information Builds Confidence?  
Submitted by Switzerland at the Meeting of Experts of the BWC, August 2008,  
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.35.

## Participation in the CBM regime in 2008


The last five years have seen a substantial improvement in CBM participation after a low of 33 CBMs submitted in 2003, the year after the Fifth Review Conference. As of 24 November 60 states have submitted a CBM. This is still a far cry from universal participation for a Convention which boasts 162 Member States. 101 countries have submitted a CBM one or more times since 1987, while 61 Member States have yet to submit their first CBM.

First-time submissions in 2008: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Indonesia and Kazakhstan.


Submissions in 2008 (States indicated in bold have made their CBMs available to the public.)

1. Argentina	16. Czech Republic	31. Kazakhstan	46. Qatar
2. Armenia	17. Ecuador	32. Latvia	47. Romania
<b>3. Australia</b>	18. Estonia	33. Lebanon	48. Republic of Korea
4. Azerbaijan	<b>19. Finland</b>	34. Libya	49. Russian Federation
5. Bahrain	20. France	<b>35. Liechtenstein</b>	50. Slovakia
6. Belarus	21. Georgia	<b>36. Lithuania</b>	51. Slovenia
7. Belgium	<b>22. Germany</b>	37. Malta	52. Spain
<b>8. Bulgaria</b>	23. Greece	38. Mexico	<b>53. Sweden</b>
9. Canada	24. Hungary	39. Morocco	<b>54. Switzerland</b>
10. Chile	25. Indonesia	40. Netherlands	55. Thailand
11. China	26. Iran	<b>41. New Zealand</b>	56. Turkey
12. Croatia	27. Iraq	42. Nigeria	57. Ukraine
13. Cuba	<b>28. Ireland</b>	<b>43. Norway</b>	<b>58. United Kingdom</b>
14. Cyprus	29. Italy	44. Poland	59. United States
<b>15. Denmark</b>	30. Japan	45. Portugal	60. Uzbekistan

Figure 1. Number of CBM submissions per year between 1987 and 2008



**Figure 2. Number of first-time CBM submissions between 1987 and 2008**



### Publicly available CBMs in 2008


14 states – more than ever before – have opted in 2008 to make their CBMs publicly available. Nine states have done so for the past three years: Australia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

9 of these can be found on the ODA website ([www.unog.ch/bwc](http://www.unog.ch/bwc)): Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

5 were provided directly to the Hamburg Research Group: Bangladesh<sup>1</sup>, Bulgaria, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway.

Other: Germany ([www.auswaertiges-amt.de](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de))

**Figure 3. Number of publicly available CBM submissions over the last seven years**



### Summary of publicly available information declared in 2008

A summary of all information declared is provided in the table below. The detailed information submitted is presented in the tables provided with this Reader.

<b>Maximum containment facilities declared in public CBMs in 2008: 17 facilities</b>	
Maximum containment facilities declared for the first time:	1 facility in Australia
	2 facilities in the United Kingdom
<b>Biodefence programmes declared in public CBMs in 2008: 9 programmes</b>	
Highest funded biodefence programme:	77.6 Million EUR in the United Kingdom
Lowest funded biodefence programme:	0.6 Million EUR in Switzerland
Biodefence facilities declared for the first time:	1 facility in Germany (Kiel)
<b>Unusual infectious disease outbreaks declared in public CBMs in 2008: 1 United Kingdom</b>	
<b>Vaccine production facilities declared in public CBMs in 2008: 16 facilities</b>	
Category A vaccine productions facilities:	5: 1 anthrax, 1 botulism, 1 plague, 2 smallpox

<sup>1</sup> Bangladesh supplied a declaration to the Hamburg Research Group but has not submitted a CBM to the Implementation Support Unit as of 24 November, 2008.

- Form A, part 1:** Number of maximum biological containment facilities (BL4 or equivalent) declared.
- Form A, part 2 (i):** Does the State Party declare having a biodefence programme?
- Form A, part 2 (iii):** Number of biodefence facilities declared.
- Form B (ii):** Number of unusual disease outbreaks declared.
- Form F:** Does the State Party declare having a past offensive and/or defensive programme?
- Form G:** Number of vaccine production facilities declared.
- ND:** “Nothing to declare” indicated in Form 0.
- NN:** “Nothing new to declare” indicated in Form 0. In brackets is the most current answer and the year it is provided.
- No data:** No information was declared despite not indicating “Nothing to declare” or “Nothing new to declare” in Form 0.

Country	Form A, part 1	Form A, part 2 (i)	Form A, part 2 (iii)	Form B (ii)	Form F (off/def)	Form G
Australia	4	yes	1	0	no/no	1
Bulgaria	0	yes	1	<i>no data</i>	no/no <sup>2</sup>	1
Denmark	0	yes	1	0	no/yes	2
Finland	0	yes	1	ND	ND	0
Germany	3 <sup>3</sup>	yes	4	ND	NN (no/yes-1992)	3
Ireland	0	no	0	0	no/no	1
Lichtenstein	NN	no	n/a	0	NN ( <i>no data</i> )	NN ( <i>no data</i> )
Lithuania	0	no	n/a	0	no/no	0
New Zealand	0	no	n/a	<i>no data</i>	no/no	0
Norway	0	yes	1	ND	no/no	3
Sweden	1	yes	<i>no data</i>	0	no/no	2
Switzerland	NN (1-2002)	yes	1	ND	NN (no/yes-2001)	NN (2-2002)
United Kingdom	9 <sup>4</sup>	yes	1	1	NN (yes/yes-1992)	3

### Research Group for Biological Arms Control

The aim of the Research Group is to contribute, through innovative research and outreach activities, to the universal prevention of biological weapons development, production and use.

The focus of activities is twofold. Firstly, the Research Group contributes to preventing the erosion of the universal bioweapons prohibition by opposing norm-harming activities. Secondly, it develops new concepts and instruments for monitoring bioweapon relevant activities and for verifying and enforcing compliance with the norm against bioweapons.

### Contact

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<sup>2</sup> In 2001, Bulgaria declared in Form F that between 1984 and 1990 three biodefence projects had been undertaken.

<sup>3</sup> Includes one maximum containment facility not suitable for work with human pathogens.

<sup>4</sup> Includes four animal pathogen maximum containment facilities designated SAPO (Specified Animal Pathogens Order).

The following three tables summarize the data declared in CBM Form A, part 1, Form A, part 2 (ii) and (iii) and Form G of the publicly available CBM submissions from 2008 with comparison with publicly available CBMs from 2006 and 2007. The first table provides the names and locations of facilities declared in CBM Form A, part 1, their containment levels, the year(s) they were declared, and whether the facilities were wholly or partly funded by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The second table indicates the overall funding for the biodefence programme as declared in CBM Form A, part 2 (ii), and lists the names and locations of biodefence facilities declared in CBM Form A, part 2 (iii), specifying the year(s) they were declared. The third table provides the names and locations of vaccine production facilities declared in CBM Form G, the year(s) they were declared, and the diseases against which vaccines were produced. For all three tables (-) indicates that there was no CBM submission or that it was not made publicly available in the respective year. A blank cell indicates that the information was not previously provided or is not applicable.

Country	Name and location of facility declared in CBM Form A, part 1	Cont. level	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007	Decl. 2008	MOD funded
Australia	1. Australian Animal Health Laboratory (Geelong)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	2. National High Security Quarantine Laboratory (North Melbourne)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	3. Queensland Health and Forensic Scientific Services (Cooper Plains)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	4. Emerging Infectious Disease and Biohazard Response Unit (Westmead)	BL4			x	no
Bulgaria	National Center of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases, Ministry of Health (Sofia)	BL3	-	-	x	no
Denmark	National Centre for Biological Defences, State Serum Institute (Copenhagen)	BL3	-	x	x	no
Finland	1. Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (Helsinki)	BL3	x	x	x	partly
	2. National Public Health Institute, Bacteriological and Virological Laboratories and Biothreat Unit (Helsinki)	BL3	x	x	x	partly
	3. Yersinia Research Laboratory (Helsinki and Turku)	BL2	x	x	x	no
	4. Department of Virology, University of Helsinki (Helsinki)	BL3	x	x	x	partly
	5. Finnish Food Safety Authority (Helsinki)	BL3		x	x	no
	6. Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (Lakiala)	BL2		x	x	yes
	7. National Public Health Institute, Department of Viral Diseases and Immunology, National Public Health Institute (Helsinki)	BL3			x	x
Germany	1. Bernhard-Nocht-Institut für Tropenmedizin (Hamburg)	BL4	x	x	x	partly
	2. Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Federal Research Institute for Animal Health (Insel Riems)	BL4 <sup>5</sup>	x	x	x	no
	3. Institut für Virologie der Philipps Universität Marburg (Marburg)	BL4	x	x	x	no
Ireland	1. National Virus Reference Laboratory, University College Dublin (Dublin)	BL3+	x	x	x	no
	2. Public Health Laboratory (Dublin)	BL3	x	x	x	no
Liechtenstein	"Nothing new to declare"	no data	-	x	x	no data
Lithuania	1. National Public Health Surveillance Laboratory (Vilnius)	BL3	x	x	x	no
	2. Lithuanian AIDS Center Laboratory (Vilnius)	BL2	x	x	x	no
	3. National Veterinary Laboratory (Vilnius)	BL2	x	x	x	no
New Zealand	Investigation and Diagnostic Centre (Upper Hutt)	BL3+	x	x	x	no
Norway	Institute of Microbiology, Armed Forces Medical Services (Oslo)	BL3	-	-	x	yes
Sweden	1. Swedish Defence Research Agency Division of NBC Defence (Umeå)	BL3	x	x	x	partly
	2. Säkerhetslaboratorium, Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control (Solna)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	3. National Veterinary Institute (Uppsala)	BL3	x	x	x	no
Switzerland	"Nothing new to declare"	no data	x	x	x	no data
United Kingdom	1. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Porton Down,	BL4	x	x	x	yes
	2. Health Protection Agency (Colindale, London)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	3. Health Protection Agency, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (Porton Down, Salisbury)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	4. National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (Potters Bar)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	5. National Institute for Medical Research (London)	BL4	x	x	x	no
	6. Veterinary Laboratories Agency (Addlestone)	SAPO4 <sup>6</sup>	x	x	x	no
	7. Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory (Woking)	SAPO4	x	x	x	no
	8. Merial Animal Health (Pirbright)	SAPO4			x	no
	9. Schering-Plough Animal Health (Uxbridge)	SAPO4			x	no

<sup>5</sup> Maximum containment facility not suitable for work with human pathogens.

<sup>6</sup> Specified Animal Pathogens Order

Country	Total funding in EUR <sup>7</sup>			Name and location of biodefence facility declared in CBM Form A, Part 2 (iii)	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007	Decl. 2008
	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007	Decl. 2008				
Australia	1.2 M	1.5 M	1.6 M	Human Protection and Performance Division, DSTO (Fishermans Bend)	x	x	x
Bulgaria	-	-	no data	National Center of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases, Ministry of Health (Sofia)	-	-	x
Denmark	-	1.9 M	2.01 M	Danish National Center for Biological Defence, State Serum Institute <sup>8</sup>	-	x	x
Finland	no data	no data	no data	Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (Helsinki)	x	x	x
Germany	12.9 M	11.7 M	11.2 M	1. NBC-Defence and Self-Protection School of the Bundeswehr (Sonthofen)	x	x	x
				2. Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology (Munich)	x	x	x
				3. Federal Armed Forces Scientific Institute for Protection Technologies – NBC Protection (Munster)	x	x	x
				4. Central Institute of the Bundeswehr Medical Service (Kiel)			x
Ireland				No Biodefence programme	x	x	x
Liechtenstein	-			No Biodefence programme	-	x	x
Lithuania				No Biodefence programme	x	x	x
New Zealand				No Biodefence programme	x	x	x
Norway	-	-	no data	Institute of Microbiology, Armed Forces Medical Services (Oslo)	-	-	x
Sweden	2.8 M	2.8 M	2.7 M	No facilities declared in CBM	no data	no data	no data
Switzerland	0.6 M	0.6 M	0.6 M	Spiez Laboratory, Swiss NBC Defence Establishment (Spiez)	x	x	x
United Kingdom	73.6 M	75 M	77.6 M	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, (Porton Down Salisbury)	x	x	x

Country	Name and location of vaccine production facility declared in CBM Form G	Cat. A diseases <sup>9</sup>	Other diseases	Decl. 2006	Decl. 2007	Decl. 2008
Australia	CSL Limited (Parkville)	Plague	yes	x	x	x
Bulgaria	BulBio – NCIPD Ltd (Sofia)		yes	-	-	x
Denmark	1. Statens Serum Institute (Copenhagen)		yes	-	x	x
	2. Bavarian Nordic A/S (Kvistgård)	Smallpox	yes	-	x	x
Finland	"Nothing new to declare"		no data	x	x	x
Germany	1. Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics GmbH & Co. KG (Marburg)	Botulism	yes	x	x	x
	2. Sächsisches Serumwerk Dresden Niederlassung der SmithKline Beecham Pharma GmbH & Co KG (Dresden)		yes	x	x	x
	3. Impfstoffwerk Dessau-Tornau GmbH (Rosslau)	Smallpox	yes	x	x	x
Ireland	Fort Dodge Laboratories (Sligo) <sup>10</sup>		no	x	x	x
Liechtenstein	no vaccine production			-	x	x
Lithuania	no vaccine production			x	x	x
New Zealand	no vaccine production			x	x	x
Norway	Alpharma (Overhalla)		yes	-	-	x
	The National Veterinary Institute (Oslo)		yes	-	-	x
	The Norwegian Institute of Public Health (Nydalen)		yes	-	-	x
Sweden	1. SBL Vaccin AB (Solna)		yes	x	x	x
	2. UniTech Biopharma (Matfors)		yes	x	x	x
Switzerland	"Nothing new to declare"		no data	x	x	x
United Kingdom	1. Health Protection Agency, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Porton Down (Salisbury)	Anthrax	no	x	x	x
	2. MedImmune (Liverpool)		yes	x	x	x
	3. Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics Limited (Liverpool)		yes	x	x	x

<sup>7</sup> National currencies were converted to Euros using the online service, www.x-rate.com. April 15th, the deadline for submitting the CBM to the UN, of each respective year was selected as the date for the currency conversion.

<sup>8</sup> No location provided.

<sup>9</sup> As designated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA.

<sup>10</sup> Not currently active but maintains capacity to produce human or animal vaccines.